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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the nature and scope of the ground
access problem to Logan Airport. While Logan itself has been
able to keep pace with its growth, ground access improvements
have not. Existing conditions are severely congested, and
forecasts project a rate of growth likely to result in even
more unacceptable levels of congestion in the next ten years.
For a long while attention focused on a construction solution
that now seems highly unlikely. A key question, then, is how
much can be accomplished by innovative schemes for utilizing
the existing highway infrastructure?
This paper analyzes two short-term operational repsonses
to ground access in Boston. The history of increased
limo/bus usage and one-way tolls suggest that a myriad of
political issues must be addressed to increase the likelihood
of implementing such technically feasible operational
responses. Evaluation of the success or failure to implement
these measures offer insights into the way in which policy
makers deal with urban transportation problems and the nature
of the political process itself.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Alan Altshuler
Title: Professor
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Chapter 1
For many years Logan Airport has viewed many of its most
pressing problems - including noise, landfill operations,
acquisition of property and other activities intended to
accomodate growth in air traffic as "capable of resolution."
While Logan has been able to keep pace with its growth,
ground access improvements have not. This paper will address
the nature and scope of the ground access "problem." For a
long while attention focused on a construction solution that
now seems unlikely. Thus, the key question is how much can
be accomplished by innovative schemes for utilizing the
existing infrastructure. This paper analyzes two short-term
operational responses to ground access traffic congestion in
Boston. Evaluation of increased limo/bus usage and one-way
tolls offer insights into the way policy makers deal with
urban transportation problems and the nature of the political
process itself.
Much of the information for this paper comes from
interviews, although specific people are only occasionally
mentioned in the text. Names are not included for the
following reasons: (1) the general information was received
from several persons, (2) the interviewee requested to remain
anonymous, or (3) the author deemed it unnecessary to the
content.
Logan Airport access is unusually constrained because the
airport is separated from most of the City of Boston and its
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suburbs by Boston Harbor, and the Harbor must be crossed in
one way or another by the large majority of air travelers
(see Appendix I for map of the area). Approximately 82
percent of the passengers reaching Logan by ground mode use
the heavily congested Sumner and Callahan Tunnels under
Boston Harbor. Route 1A ramps extend from the East Boston
end of the tunnels and connect to the Airport access/egress
roads. An alternative approach to the airport is over the
Mystic-Tobin Bridge, the only other harbor crossing. Access,
however, between the bridge and the airport is over local
streets. Because of this, and because the tunnel route is
much more direct, almost all air passengers use the Sumner
and Callahan Tunnels. Although the Bridge does provide an
important alternative for non-airport traffic crossing the
harbor, it is also heavily congested. A third harbor
crossing south of the tunnels has been considered.
After almost two decades of debate, it now seems that the
likelihood of a third harbor crossing being built in the
20th century is small. In 1972, for example, the Boston
Transportation Planning Review (BTPR), a cooperative planning
effort by Massachusetts public agencies, proposed a special
purpose tunnel, but the Dukakis Administration (1974-78)
opposed any tunnel construction as did Speaker of the House
Tip O'Neal and Senator Edward Kennedy. Ed King, Massachu-
setts Governor from 1978-82, and a strong supporter of the
project, authorized an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
to study options for construction. Just as the EIS was
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completed in December 1982, Dukakis returned to office.
Recently Secretary of Transportation Frederick P.
Salvucci has proposed that other options be studied including
the depression of the Central Artery. (The Central Artery
feeds the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels on the Boston end; it
is a 2 mile section of a long highway, 1-93, with closely
spaced access/egress ramps, narrow lanes and steep grades.)
EIS studies must be finished by September 1983 for any pro-
ject to qualify for federal financing. Such financing is a
necessity as it would cover 90 percent of the project's
costs.
Adequacy of the ground access system is viewed
differently by various groups. Often airport access problems
are defined in terms of the air passenger. However, there
are other people in addition to air travelers who see the
system as inadequate. These include, most notably, people
using the tunnels for non-airport trips. In addition,
numerous professional airport planners and traffic engineers
view it as one of the state's most pressing transportation
issues. On the other side of the debate are people who feel
that the air passenger does not always need to be catered to.
They argue that access can be improved but large expenditures
for such improvements may not be the appropriate use of
scarce financial resources. Finally, people who do not live
near the tunnels or use them frequently are not likely to see
it as a serious issue.
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Logan ground access congestion represents different costs
and benefits to different parties. There are, in general,
three different perspectives. Air travelers seek to reach
Logan quickly and reliably with maximum convenience and an
attractive trip, although cost is also a consideration.
Massport, the airport operator, is interested in Logan's
continued growth and the smooth running of its operations.
Logan has long been the chief source of Massport's revenues.
Although Logan dominates air travel in the area, it is in
Massport's best interest not to have Logan become associated
with being a "hassle."
Several other groups which may be interested in growth
include: the Boston area business community and those
employees of downtown hotels and restaurants who depend
indirectly on Logan to attract tourists for business. The
City of Boston and the Commonwealth may begin to take a more
active interest in the effects of ground access congestion on
the local economy in the years to come.
Residents of the neighborhoods adjacent to Logan are the
main opponents of ground access improvements and of Logan
growth generally. When asked what particular problems at
Logan upset the local area, one local official replied, "It's
Logan, period." "We can't build more homes in East Boston,
but it's OK for Logan to keep getting bigger," stated another
referring to East Boston residents as "victims" The problems
range from expansion of facilities to noise to construction
disruption. Traffic is just one more negative factor
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resulting from the preceived intrusion of Logan on the daily
lives of East Boston residents. Logan-bound truck traffic on
local streets is a problem just as the sheer volume of cars
and the abundance of parking lots remind people of Logan's
proximity. Although air quality and safety may not be their
first complaints, they are negative consequences which the
immediate areas experience most intensely.
Taxpayer groups, finally, tend to be sensitive to the
costs involved in projects to ease, congestion. Some tax-
payers doubtless see congestion as a problem but one to be
addressed only by inexpensive means.
Regardless of one's perspective, most would agree that
the close proximity of Logan to downtown is a valuable
resource to the region. Some firms, such as the Sheraton
Corporation, located their headquarters in Boston specifi-
cally because of the close location of the CBD to Logan.
According to a Boston Globe report at the time, Sheraton
would not have invested in Boston otherwise. 1
Congestion can be expressed quantitatively by several
methods reflecting the degree of adequacy of a facility. Two
measures referred to in this paper are level of service (LOS)
and road capacity. LOS is an abstract measure encompassing
speed, throughput and volume in relation to the capacity of
the access system. The six levels represented by the letters
A through F, range from free-flow to jammed conditions. LOS
A-D are acceptable operating conditions in an urban context.2
(For a pictoral representation of LOS see Appendix II.)
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Capacity is the physical ability of a system to handle a
given volume of traffic.
The percentage of cross harbor traffic that is Logan-
bound continues to increase every year. It was 40 percent in
1972 and is estimated to be between 53 and 57 percent at
present.3 This increase is a reflection of increased acti-
vity at the airport and relatively static local travel
volumes.
Logan Enplanements (rounded to the nearest million) 4
1960 - 2.8 mil.
1965 - 5.5 mil.
1970 - 9.4 mil.
1975 - 10.5 mil.
1980 - 14.7 mil.
The total two-way capacity (maximum achievable hourly
flow) of the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels and the Tobin Bridge
is estimated at 117,000 vehicles per day. The maximum
achievable hourly flow of both the Callahan and Sumner
Tunnels is roughly 1600-1630 vehicle/hour/lane, or 3200-3260
vehicle/hour per direction. 5 The maximum possible volume is
apparently achieved with significantly greater regularity and
frequency in the Sumner Tunnel than in the Callahan, even
though the Callahan peak periods are of longer duration on
the average. According to Brian Day (traffic consultant to
Massport), "a major direct cause of the Callahan's 'sub-
capacity' performance is the speed variances that exist
between vehicles at the tunnel entrance, between tunnel
lanes, and between adjacent sections of the traffic." 6 Speed
variances at the tunnel entrance have been due to bottlenecks
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in the Callahan tunnel where 8 lanes merged into 2 in about
200 feet. The Sumner bottleneck is worst at its exit. The
volume is established by operating speed.
Some studies focus on the "daily throughput potential" of
the existing highway facilities. If one estimates daily
capacity as 17 times hourly capacity, 52,700 one-way vehicle
trips per day can be accommodated in the tunnels. 7 This
analysis is relevant to Logan users as they constitute such a
high percentage of all tunnel traffic. The practical utility
of the tunnel, however, is governed less by its daily
capacity than by its capacity during the peak hours of air-
line trip demand. The fact that the peaks in airport traffic
coincide with the daily metropolitan work-trip peaks only
makes the problem worse. In other words, most of Boston is
moving at the same time.
There are differences in the flow of traffic in the two
tunnels during the morning peak. The Callahan Tunnel
experiences little congestion during morning peaks (with the
exception of Monday, a commuting friend tells me). The
majority of morning traffic operates at speeds of about 30
m.p.h. and elapsed times through the tunnel average 2
minutes. 8  In contrast, the Sumner Tunnel experiences severe
congestion during the morning peak; LOS is F. Toll booths
are located at the entrance to the Sumner Tunnel, while they
are at the end of the Callahan Tunnel. While an adequate
number of toll booths exist to serve current demand volume in
the Sumner Tunnel, the entrance is severely congested because
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of the constricted merge from 7 toll-booth lanes into two
lanes within only a 200-foot distance. Bottlenecks exist at
the tunnel egress on the Boston side because of pedestrian
crossings and local traffic. Queues which originate on the
Boston end of the tunnel extend through the entire tunnel and
onto Route lA as far back as the Airport Road interchange
(approximately 1/2 miles). 9
In the evening peak, LOS F operations exist in both
tunnels. As in the morning peak, local street traffic and
pedestrians create back-ups so Callahan Tunnel traffic
experiences long queues and delays at the Boston entrance.
The bottleneck from the merging lanes in the Callahan
entrance is made worse by the queues on the Central Artery
and the other feeder streets to the tunnel. 1 0 The chart on
the next page illustrates the total inbound traffic to Logan
by time of day. 1 1
Tunnel volumes are a direct reflection of mode choice.
If a privately owned car is available, it generally is used
unless it is very inconvenient or another mode is easily
accessible. "Driving to the airport is part of American
culture," commented Cathy Donaher, former Massport Planning
Director. The following is 1982 data on daily person vehicle
trips by mode for air passengers arriving at Logan by ground
transportation: 12
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Air Passenger % Vehicle Vehicle
Mode Person-Trips Person-Trips Trips Trips
MBTA 1,096 6.3 None 0.0
Other Bus 581 3.3 60 0.3
Taxi 3,422 19.6 4,655 22.8
Limo 893 5.1 251 1.3
Rental 1,965 11.3 1,638 8.0
Private Car 9,492 54.4 13,829 67.7
TOTAL 17,449 100.0 20,433 100.1
(Note: Because of drop-offs, there are often two vehicle
trips for one air-passenger person trip. Massport ignores
transit vehicle trips in its vehicle counts because few
transit vehicles utilize the harbor crossings. Transit buses
and vans are numerous on Logan's circulation roads, however,
mainly circulating from the rapid transit station, rental car
companies, etc.)
In total, the 17,449 inbound air passengers generate
20,433 vehicular trips, or 1.2 vehicle trips per inbound
passenger per day. 1 3 The percentages here have been somewhat
constant over the years paralleling Logan's growth. In 1970,
29.4 million passenger trips were made to Logan, and the mode
split was: 1 4
84.2% private and rental car
6.2% transit
7.5% taxi and limo
2.1% other
In 1982, a total of 67.7 percent of vehicle trips were in
private cars. Increased taxi ridership, from 7.5 percent
(with limos) to 22.8 percent (for taxis only) in 1982,
accounts for some of the decrease in use of private cars. 1 5
Logan also employs about 12,000 people, of whom up to
9,000 work on any single weekday. These 9,000 employees
generate 18,000 trips going to and from Logan at the start
and end of work and, according to a Cambridge Systematics
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study, they make an additional 8,000 trips during work hours.
These 26,000 daily employee trips represent about one-fourth
of all airport ground traffic and one third of airport-bound
private vehicle traffic. 1 6
Since employers provide free parking (often guaranteed by
union contract), there is little incentive for employees not
to drive. Massport efforts to encourage car pools have been
unsuccessful. Employee hours are, fortunately, more
staggered than at most other employment sites. The Cambridge
Systematics survey revealed that about half of all employees
start work between 6 am and 9 am and end between 2:30 pm and
6 pm.1 7
Following are Massport's estimates of Logan employee
access modes as of 1982:18
Adjusted Adjusted
Mode Freq. (%) Person-Trips
Auto driver 81.3 9,592
Auto passenger 6.8 805
MBTA, Massport Bus 8.3 977
Walk 0.4 47
Taxi 0.3 35
Motorcycle 1.0 118
Other 1.7 200
99.8 11,774
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Finally, a brief overview of the parking situation: 1 9
Public Garage Parking
Capacity 8,700 spaces (public)
Peak Occupancy (average day) 5,500 vehicles
Peak Occupancy (average Wed./Thurs.) 7,000 vehicles
Peak Occupancy (Wed/Thurs. in Aug.) 8,400 vehicles
Overnight Occupancy 3,900 vehicles
Saturation of parking cpacity at Logan is a growing problem.
Last year Logan lots overflowed only a few times whereas this
year it occurred 5 times during just a two week period in
April. Massport is currently considering strategies to
address the situation.
Air traveler parking demand seems to be highly inelastic
as a function of price. Any elasticity between -- l and 0
implies that the total revenues will increase when price
increases. The gain in revenue will be greater when price is
increased to hold demand constant than if additional spaces
are made available to accomodate all demand at unaltered
prices. The Logan price elasticity of demand is extremely
low (-.12 to -. 13).20 Recent rate increases have not
affected short-term parkers, but they have encouraged long-
term parkers to use alternative off-airport park n'fly
facilities. Massport, it seems, has relatively little
leverage to control total demand for parking.
Compared to airports in most major American cities, Logan
is very close to the CBD, as indicated by the following: 2 1
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Airport Distance from CBD
1. Seattle - Sea Pac 20
2. Dallas - Fort Worth 19
3. Chicago - O'Hare 19
4. Las Vegas - MacCarren 16
5. San Francisco International 15
6. Los Angeles International 13
7. Atlanta - Hartsfield 9
8. Miami International 7
9. Boston - Logan 3
Avg: 15 miles
(not including Logan)
By their location, airports distant, from their CBD's can be
said to impose significant access costs on air travelers. In
Logan's case, access costs are becoming very high despite the
proximity because peak demands strain both the immediate
airport roads and the entire transportation subsystem of the
Boston central area. The questions that keep recurring are:
to what extent are people willing to tolerate the severe
congestion access to Logan and what "price" are they willing
to pay to improve it?
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Chapter 2
The following section looks at the future of ground
access to Logan. Forecasts of future airport activity and
the ground traffic it generates play an important role in
policy making. The latest forecasts are presented to create
a realistic sense of the problems that await travelers and
politicians by the year 1990 and 2010. It is also
instructive to review how forecasts are derived to help the
reader gain perspective on forecasting and its uses.
The most recent forecasts of ground traffic generated by
Logan (CTPS, May 1982) were based on two factors: (1) the
activities going on at Logan (enplanements and air cargo) and
(2) the methods used by people to reach the airport.
Forecasts were made for 2010; 1990 forecasts were derived
from the 2010 results. The translation of Logan activities
into ground traffic depends on the second factor above.
These are described by (1) mode split - how many people use
each of the various modes available, and (2) vehicle
occupancy rates - how many individuals are in each vehicle
type on average.1
Three scenarios were developed with respect to mode split
and occupancy rates: (1) present situation extended, (2)
moderate increases in public transit and vehicle occupancy
rates, and (3) maximum diversion to transit. 2 The last was
premised upon major transit improvements such as connection
of the Red and Blue rapid transit lines, doubled cost for
20
parking (it is $6 a day at present), and imposition of an
airport access toll. 3 Logan is served to a station at the
airport boundary by the Blue Line of the MBTA and between the
station and terminal buildings by bus. Passengers from
northern, western or southern suburbs, as well as most
passengers from downtown Boston, have no direct access to the
Blue Line. Most transfer to it from other lines. The Red
Line reaches Cambridge to the northwest and Braintree to the
south; it includes Park Street, a major downtown station, but
an additional transfer is necessary to reach the Blue Line.
The following table indicates the Average Weekday Daily
Traffic (AWDT) for 1977 and the estimated 2010 AWDT for each
scenario: 4
Scenario 2010 AWDT (one-way) Increase Over 1977
1977 base (32,550) # %
I. 57,900 23,350 78
II. 51,509 18,959 58
III. 38,752 6,202 19
If the methods used to reach Logan in 1979 remain the
same in 2010 (Scenario I), then 23,350 extra vehicles will
enter Logan on the average weekday. 75 percent of that
growth will occur under Scenario II and only 25 percent under
Scenario 111.5
The following are capacity-constrained forecasts under
Scenario I. Note the modest increases in Central Artery and
Southeast Expressway traffic.
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1982 - 2010 Increase 6
Interstate Route 93 19%
Mystic-Tobin Bridge 9%
Storrow Drive 8%
Callahan & Sumner Tunnels 11%
Central Artery 4%-10%
Massachusetts Turnpike 12%
Southeast Expressway 5%
Route lA (North to Airport) 30%
During the morning and evening peaks in 2010, the Central
Artery will become jammed from the long queues waiting to
enter the Callahan Tunnel from the city. In the p.m. hours,
both the north and southbound directions will be clogged and
the queue will extend as far as the Haymarket Square off-ramp
(approximately 2 miles). 7 Volumes in the Callahan Tunnel
will increase by approximately 40 percent, and 20 percent in
the Sumner Tunnel between 1982 and 2010.8
In 2010, the morning peak will have queues from four ramp
junctions that will block the northbound Central Artery flow.
A lengthy queue from the Callahan Tunnel on-ramp, not
estimated to exist in 1982 and 1990, will be congested back
onto the Artery. 9 According to the Third Harbor Crossing
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the southbound
direction will be severely congested because of two ramp
junctions, queues will extend nearly to the Tobin Bridge on-
ramp and the Callahan Tunnel off-ramp. Ramps generally will
have volumes in excess of computed capacity. The Route 1A-
Logan connection will also have extreme congestion
problems.10
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The LOS F conditions presently existing in the tunnels
will be exacerbated in 2010. The constriction point of the
Sumner Tunnel (the East Boston entrance) where seven toll
booth lanes are funneled into the two-lane tunnel will
continue to be a major source of congestion as the toll
plaza's capacity will be exceeded in 1990 and 2010.
Operating speeds will average well below 15-20 m.p.h. in the
peak period. 1 1
One indicator of increased congestion is estimation of
the number of congested hours of operation. If the patterns
of hourly distribution remain the same, the LOS of E or F in
the Sumner Tunnel will last for five of the six a.m. hours
between 6 a.m. and 12 noon and all nine hours between 12 noon
and 9 p.m. At present this congestion lasts three hours in
the morning and two in the evening. Currently there are
usually few problems in the morning in the Callahan Tunnel.
In 2010 LOS E or F will exist from 6 a.m. to 12 noon and in
the evening, today's 5-hour congestion period will expand to
8.12
These congestion levels can be scaled to approximate the
situation in 1990. The 1990 CTPS forecasts used the same
assumptions and methods as the 2010 forecast for Scenario I.
Scenario II differs only slightly because it arrives at the
increase in public transport and vehicle occupancy rates in a
linear fashion from 1979-2010 instead of using a more
involved process. According to these estimates, enplanements
are forecast to increase 20 percent over the 1979 level,
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employment 9 percent and air cargo tonnage 39 percent. These
activity forecasts apply to both Scenarios. Under I, the
1990 Logan Average Weekday Daily Traffic (AWDT) is projected
to be 43,700 vehicles (one-way), an increase of 21 percent
over 1979 (36,246), and 34 percent over 1977 (32,550). Under
II, the projected AWDT is 16 percent higher than the 1979
AWDT and 29 percent over the 1977 AWDT. 1 3
According to the Third Harbor Crossing EIS, in 1990, the
Callahan Tunnel will have a 16 percent increase in morning
peak traffic and 31 percent increase in the evening. The
Sumner Tunnel will have a 9 percent increase in the morning
and a 6 percent increase in the evening. Traffic flow will
remain at LOS F and toll plaza capacity will be exceeded.
Several roads will also experience increased volume
including: 1-93 (north of the high level bridge) (14%), the
Pike (12%), Route 1A (16%), the airport access/egress roads
(20%), and sections of the Central Artery (9%). Traffic
growth will be more rapid from 1982-1990 than 1990-2010 on
the three cross-harbor facilities as well as most of the
nearby roadway network. 1 4
The 1990 traffic would produce substantial queues. The
ramp junctions in particular would be affected. For
instance, the almost two-fold increase in traffic predicted
for the northbound off-ramp to the Callahan Tunnel would
create a queue extending onto the Central Artery with back-
ups (of about 1 mile) almost to the Congress Street on-ramp.
The average queue time during the peak at the Sumner toll
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plaza would increase from its present 5.8 minutes to 10.8
minutes in 1990 and 12.5 minutes in 2010. The Callahan .6
minute wait would become 8.7 minutes in 1990 and 14.5 minutes
in 2010.15
The huge increases in traffic and congestion between 1982
and 2010 are likely to cause many types of effects. There
may be some impact on the potential economic growth in the
surrounding areas. The inconvenience of reaching Logan from
areas south and west may at some point begin to marginally
reduce growth in development ventures. The traffic will have
its most adverse affects on business and homes located in the
streets surrounding the tunnel portals. Property values in
the CBD may at some point also suffer some negative
impacts. 16
Land-use conflicts with East Boston are likely to
continue. Although Massport is no longer taking property by
eminent domain, recent concerns have revolved around the
increased usage of local property for airport-related
activities, such as freight-forwarding, parking lots, and car
rental storage. With the anticipated increase in traffic, in
the next ten years Boston residents are worried about the
effects on land use and are now focusing on zoning changes. 1 7
The effect of congestion on Logan's growth in passenger
and air cargo is likely to be nonexistent. Air travel demand
is inelastic because most air journeys serve needs for which
there is no practical alternative. The distribution of
flights scheduled throughout the day, however, could be
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affected by congestion. This congestion could also affect
the overall business climate.
The increased traffic will result in worsened environ-
mental quality in the neighborhoods nearby. There will be
increases in air pollution, noise, and vibration and a
decrease in traffic safety for pedestrians crossing near the
tunnel portals on the Boston side. The level of CO con-
centration will increase at the tunnel entrances. Demo-
graphic changes such as a growing elderly population in East
Boston may increase the seriousness of the environmental
problems in the area. 1 8
It is likely that public transportation usage will grow.
The increased traffic demand that cannot be met by the
roadway infrastructure will probably cause people to change
to another mode. By 2010, it is predicted that the Blue
Line, bus, taxi, and limo services together will, at a mini-
mum, be serving additional demand equivalent to 12,800
airport-related vehicle trips. 1 9 If it is assumed that each
private vehicle has a single passenger occupant, the 6,400
one way trips represent a tripling of present transit-limo-
taxi volumes. 2 0 Since the total percent increase of Scenario
I riders is unlikely to be much greater than 10 percent, most
of the shift will be to the limo and taxi modes. 2 1  This
suggests that the CTPS Scenario II, which assumes some modal
switch, may be more likely to occur than Scenario I, because
of road capacity constraints if nothing else.
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The extreme nature of the traffic congestion may cause a
perception of deterioration in the relative quality of life
enjoyed by citizens in the region as well as those in local
areas near Logan. Convenience and the ability to move free
of chronic traffic might be viewed by some as indicators of
quality of life. One question to consider is whether quality
of life is an unconscious force influencing whether/when
people become "bothered enough" to act on an issue. Is it
ever possible to reflect in a forecast the quality of life as
perceived by a local population?
It is valuable to understand not only the information and
methdology used in forecasting but how they are used. In
1979, Charles River Associates (CRA) predicted a growth rate
for Logan of 5 percent per year and a tripling of passenger
enplanements to approximately 45 million by 2000.22 In 1980,
Alan Eng at Massport offered his own upper- and lower-bound
forecasts. The upper assumed a growth rate of 4.6 percent or
an increase in passenger traffic from 15.1 million in 1979 to
38.7 million in the year 2000. Eng's lower-bound, construc-
ted with less cheery assumptions, projected growth of 3.1
percent.2 3 Some industry analysts and aviation planners now
view this range as overly optimistic. These professionals
contend that continuation of past trends, as implied in these
forecasts, is not likely to occur. (Robert Mellman from
Charles River Associates, however, remains convinced that the
airlines have a bright future.) Eng's forecast was consis-
tent with those of the FAA and AIA among others at the
27
time.24
A revised 1981 rate of 2.5 percent, used in Massport's
Bird Island Flats forecasts, is similar to the most recent
1982 numbers. In the latest forecast a high, low and mean
forecast is given for each year. The "principal forecast
year" is 1987, when passenger traffic increases to: high -
17.2 (growth rate 2.5 percent), low - 16.0, and mean - 16.6
million. 2 5 The low rate of just two years back is now the
high end of the forecast envelope. According to Massport
planner Joe Brevard, however, any numbers past 1987 are "just
educated guesswork." 2 6  The envelope is a useful way to
capture the margin of uncertainty inherent in forecasting,
especially when it spans 7-10 years or more.
Timing can influence the range and accuracy of a fore-
cast. The CRA projections, for example, were completed in
the first full year of deregulation which, according to
industry analyst Steve Martin, undermined the credibility of
the forecasts in the eyes of aviation specialists. The
Airlines own forecasts usually concentrate exclusively on
changes in their own market share and future performance, and
therefore have limited use. 2 7
Four main factors influence these air passenger
predictions. One of the most important indicators is the
state of the U.S. economy. The elasticity of air travel as a
function of income and growth is high. Therefore, during
times of recession, travel decreases while the opposite
occurs during more prosperous times. The Massport forecasts
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were based on recent national economy forecasts prepared by
Data Resources Inc. (DRI). DRI looks at policy factors such
as interest rates and federal monetary policy, among others
to derive several scenarios which reflect the anticipated
pattern of GNP ("recovery slope"). The outcomes of these
scenarios provided the basis for the high and low boundary of
the Massport forecast envelope. 2 8
The relative strength or weakness of the relationship
between the national air carrier industry and the national
economy could be significant. It seems that the industry
growth path (measured in revenue passenger miles) has
generally paralleled national GNP (in real terms) and was
most closely correlated during the years 1968 to 1977.
Increases in air travel over these years were about at the
same rate as GNP increases. Between 1977 and 1979, GNP grew
more slowly than air travel and from 1979 to 1981, GNP fell
faster than air travel.2 9
Logan passenger traffic has increased more quickly than
New England income over the last six years but has paralleled
national passenger traffic growth. New England and regional
aggregate personal income as a fraction of the U.S. dropped
about 9 percent from 1969-1980. At the same time, an index
comparing Logan passenger traffic to New England regional
income (Logan enplanements divided by constant 1972 dollar
New England income), increased by 20 percent. 3 0 Furthermore,
New England economic growth is in sectors that use air travel
intensively. The regions's high tech firms are strong,
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closely linked to governments and market throughout the
continent and Europe, and seem to have a promising future.
The availability and cost of fuel is also a critical
element. Fuel cost (30%) and labor constitute the major
costs of air transport. 3 1  Consequently an increase or
decrease in fuel prices can significantly influence air fares
and levels of demand. However, more efficient models (e.g.,
the Boeing 767) are to some degree reducing the importance of
this factor.
Since 1978, deregulation has played a central role in
influencing the numbers of people flying in several ways,
primarily by intensifying price competition in major markets.
Larger numbers of people are flying and flights are spreading
across the peak. Many industry analysts maintain that the
full implications of deregulation nationally and on Logan's
operation are not yet fully apparent. 3 2
Three factors, in addition to air traffic growth,
contribute to increased ground traffic:
(1) Greater numbers of people are living and working
outside of the CBD where there are few transportation options
besides private car. Significant growth, especially in hotel
and office space is occurring in the central area at present,
but a corresponding surge in non-auto modes to Logan is
unlikely. One reason is that most Logan users who reside in
the region leave from or return to their homes, not the CBD.
(2) Several planned Massport harbor development projects
are likely to increase traffic especially the Bird Island
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Flats (BIF) project, a cargo and mixed use development,
located adjacent to Logan and to be completed in 1987. Anti-
cipating increased traffic as a result of the BIF develop-
ment, the Massport EIS has put forth about ten provisions to
mitigate the adverse impacts. These include: a "Logan
Commuter Plan" - a program of ride sharing and van pooling,
MBTA pass subsidies, higher employee parking fees (employers
will bear this cost), limited BIF parking, support of
increased bus and limo service, ferry access to BIF, transit
access to BIF and soon. 3 3
Massport expects these measures to improve the transit/
ferry modeshare from its existing 6.6 percent for airport
employees to 9.1 percent. Further, employee auto occupancy
is predicted to improve to 1.4 from 1.2 per vehicle in the
p.m. peak hour. 3 4 Massport officials say specific elements
of these provisions will be implemented as they become
relevant. The use of a 40-seat shuttle bus, for example, will
not be necessary for some time, so a 20-seat van is scheduled
to begin service first. To promote staggered scheduling and
help defuse congestion, a provision in the Massport-BIF
developer's agreement requires that not more than a certain
percentage of employees leave at peak hours. The developers
will incorporate this into leases with their tenants.
Despite the limited transit market, Massport is also
considering renovating MBTA stations to encourage greater
usage.35
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No one I interviewed at Massport mentioned these
measures, however, in discussions about the access issue in
general. The silence may reflect a lack of expectation that
these measures are likely to have much effect.
(3) Since deregulation in 1978, airline pricing
strategies have been designed to improve load factors.
Deregulation has influenced the numbers and time when people
travel (e.g., the month, week, time of day, and destination).
Price discrimination is vigorous. There is evidence of these
effects at Logan, said Steve Martin, but no hard data yet.
The air traffic controllers strike had a similar though
temporary effect on the spread of flights. During and
following the strike, the number of planes flying at each
hour was carefully regulated. 3 6
All forecasts incorporate uncertain factors. A sample
from a past forecast for Logan exhibits one reason why some
apprehension about forecasting is justified. In 1972, the
BTPR forecast that enplaned passengers a day at Logan would
reach 25,300 by 1975, and 33,000 in 1980.37 In 1980, they
were 41,600.38 In 1972, the average weekday daily traffic
(AWDT) two-way volume of the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels was
predicted to increase from 62,000 in 1970 to 92,000 in 1980
under an assumption of unconstrained vehicle demand and
70,000 if constrained. 3 9 In 1982, on the average weekday,
the observed two-way volume of the Sumner and Callahan
Tunnels was 82,800 vehicles. 4 0 The three harbor crossings
carried 33,465 vehicles one-way to or from Logan and 67,000
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on a two directional basis.
It is unlikely that forecasting has become more accurate
since 1978. According to traffic consultant Brian Day, there
is a factor difference of 333 percent in growth estimates,
ranging from 1.5 - 5 percent per annum, which have occurred
in the past three years. In the Logan Land Use Master Plan
Study (November 1981), the consulting firm of Wallace, Floyd,
et al., and Griffith Associates stated:
Forecasts of air travel are historically unreliable.
DeNeufville has shown that half of the passenger
forecasts sampled by him were incorrect by approxi-
matel4y 20 percent, only six years after they were
make.
(Note: the 20 percent refers to the growth rate.)
Massport must consider the implications of its forecasts
before they are announced to the general public. As one
aviation staff member pointed out, it is in Massport's
interest not to alarm the local community with forecasts of
immense growth. He said that as a result, Massport tends to
"understate" its forecasts whenever it can and often avoids
any press on the issue of growth. This is a change from the
1960s when the approach involved large growth announcements
to justify big projects. Now it seems that Massport's aim is
to avert any charges that such projects are needed.
When one reviews the forecasts of Logan growth, it
appears that forecasts are guided by the trends occuring at
the time the forecast is made. Increasing travel in the late
1970s were reflected in the optimistic CRA forcasts of 1979.
In the early 1980s, in the midst of increased fuel prices,
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economic stagnation, and declining air travel, the
projections become more conservative. Will the present surge
in air activity and the upward movement of the economy result
in another revision?
Forecasters acknowledge the role that the current
environment plays but maintain that forecasts do not reflect
economic cycles - though no one can be sure if cycles are
long-term or not. Some factors that affect forecasts are
one-time events (e.g., initial response to deregulation)
while other factors will reoccur at different times with
varying severity (e.g., national economic recession, fuel
price changes). Consequently, a steady state is predicted.
The fact that the parameters of the "state" vary depending on
the situation at present merits consideration.
Each forecast scenario has different implications for
access demand over the long term. The CRA scenario is the
worst case, from a traffic standpoint, with 5 percent growth
per year. Drastic measures would be necessary to enable
Logan to continue to function under this case. Even with 1.5
percent growth per annum, some deterioration in Logan access
and the rest of the Boston transportation system is highly
probable.
The predominant response of Logan-bound travelers in the
face of worsened traffic congestion and lowered travel time
reliability will be to leave themselves more time for Logan
access trips, and otherwise to endure the increased cost in
time, convenience, and work productivity.
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Chapter 3
There are physical and operational solutions to the
ground access problem. The main physical solutions put forth
in the last 15 years include: a general purpose Third Harbor
Crossing, a special purpose harbor crossing, and improvements
to the MBTA. The political and technical aspects of each
solution have been debated and ultimately viewed as inade-
quate solutions at the time they were considered. After a
brief summary of these physical proposals and their problems,
operational responses will be addressed. Explanation of the
concept and features of operational responses will clarify
why they should be pursued to alleviate ground access con-
gestion. Two examples of operational solutions - increased
limo usage and one-way tolls - will then be explored in
depth.
Airport-destined traffic from the corridors with the
highest demand compete with non-airport traffic for the
limited capacity of the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels. Any
physical solution to this limitation in the Boston trans-
portation network, such as a Third Harbor Crossing, would
entail huge investment costs and require years for implemen-
tation. Although earlier I concluded that the prospects for
a Third Harbor Crossing are dim at best, the issues around
the debate are at the heart of whether a physical solution is
appropriate. For this reason some of these issues will be
explored further.
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The controversy surrounding the Third Harbor Crossing has
focused mainly upon the traffic benefits of the tunnel vs.
negative community and environmental impacts. Several
options for the exact alignment of the tunnel have been
discussed but they all involve either significant disruption
of the East Boston community or represent future Logan growth
to the residents who are strongly opposed to any tunnel. The
options also have unfavorable environmental externalities.
Furthermore, the estimated cost of a tunnel approaches 2
billion dollars. Together these factors have swayed the
opinion of several prominent politicians against any action
for a tunnel in the near term.
A special purpose tunnel, first proposed by the BTPR in
1972, would have gone far towards alleviating the disruption
problem. The concept of a special purpose facility,
restricted to limos, buses, taxis and trucks destined speci-
fically for Logan would have insured a high level of service
for this airport-bound traffic, and would have provided a
powerful incentive for airport travelers and visitors to
leave their cars behind. The anticipated diversion of air-
port travelers away from auto use was expected to have a
significantly beneficial effect on the congestion in those
tunnels. The crossing was opposed by the incoming Dukakis
administration both because of his dedication to transit and
political considerations.
Major improvements to the MBTA is another physical solu-
tion considered to relieve congestion. The response of the
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current governor to the ground access problem at Logan has
been to call for rapid transit, most often to connect or
improve service between the CBD and the airport. Dukakis has
a long reputation as an avid devotee of the MBTA and viewed
it as the "solution." This response, however, ignores the
spacial distribution of demand. Roughly two thirds of
Logan's passengers now come from beyond the MBTA network. 1
There is no reason to assume that the spread of demand will
change in the near future.
Traditionally, and especially in the 1970s, the MBTA Blue
Line, with Massport bus service to access Logan, has been an
appealing option because of the high unused capacity that the
system offers without any deterioration of service quality
when demand rises. This performance capability stands in
striking contrast to highway access, which is limited to
about 1600 vehicles per hour per lane. 2
Despite these Blue Line attributes, its use as a means to
Logan has not been attractive to most air travelers for
several reasons. They include: the number of transfers
required, the unreliability of the service (perceived and
actual), the difficulty of handling luggage, and the limited
geographic spread of MBTA lines. As a consequence, ridership
of the Blue Line has remained at a low 6 percent from 1970
through 1979.3
It seems almost impossible to make the MBTA a viable
alternative to highway access to Logan. By extending the
Blue Line to Park Street and directly to the Logan terminal,
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it is estimated that the mode split could rise from 6 percent
to 9 percent. Under conditions of extreme future highway
congestion, the transit share might increase to 13.6 per-
cent.4
Governor Sargent vetoed such Blue Line improvements in
the early 1970s due to cost considerations, and this decision
has been accepted by subsequent administrations. The 1975
Logan Master Plan also rejected improvements to the subway
access system to Logan:
...even if rapid transit lines served the Airport
directly, with no transfer delays, rail transit
inherently lacks the "flexibility" to pick up the
large number of passengers living in scattered
locations throughout the suburbs...The result is
that fixed rail transit cannot begin to compete with
buses or automobiles and consequently can never
attract enough airport-destined riders to signifi-
cantly reduce harbor crossing travel demand. 5
If anything is to be done about the Logan access problem,
then the planning emphasis needs to be directed towards less
ambitious, less costly and simpler approaches to the problem,
making use of existing capital facilities. Operational
responses do not respond to the access problem as simply one
of transporting people and goods to and from the airport,
rather, the transportation objective is to also ensure mini-
mum environmental and neighborhood disruption. On and off
through the 1970s there has been support for this approach.
The operational simplicity and potential effectiveness of
these methods have served to enhance any support for their
implementation. Because construction requirements are low,
lead time for development is short and costs and disruption
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are low. Unlike large scale ventures, operational improve-
ments are able to respond to changing population trends and
patterns of behavior. They may be more reponsive in two
ways: (1) the nature of the technique (e.g., traffic manage-
ment) lends itself to reacting swiftly; (2) because less
investment and lead time are required there is less risk
involved if a technique needs to be altered to become more
effective (e.g., access toll). However, the benefits of
operational strategies tend to be undramatic as well.
Several types of operational responses to ground access
have been considered in Boston during the last decade. These
include: ferry service, remote parking facilities with
shuttle bus, traffic management techniques, downtown check-in
facilities, an access toll, employee car/van pooling pro-
grams, minor improvements to the MBTA and the two elaborated
on in this analysis: one way tolls and increased bus/limo
usage (hereafter referred to as limo).
Many of the techniques normally considered to be likely
operational options are infeasible to implement. Some, like
priority lanes, are technically infeasible. It is not
possible to make one lane of a two-lane tunnel into a special
lane. Other methods, like an access toll, are politically
infeasible. In 1972, an EPA study recommended a 5 dollar
access toll to 'enter' Boston as part of the "State Implemen-
tation Plan to fulfill the requirements of the Clean Air Act.
This proposal was met by a storm of public protest and set
aside.6
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The two operational responses discussed in this paper
appear to be technically feasible in most ways but encounter
problems in implementation on other fronts. Massport sup-
ported a pro limo policy, without realizing the political
trouble it would encounter with the cab drivers and other
operational difficulties. A one-way toll policy is techni-
cally satisfactory, but faced intergovernmental problems
especially during debates over the Third Harbor Crossing.
The effects of limos and one-way tolls in theory will be
presented first looking at the technical data and opera-
tional features. How the solutions have fared in practice to
date will then be assessed. The current situation will be
summarized highlighting operational problems that have
emerged. Finally, political and institutional issues will be
discussed.
The following section will first put forth the theoreti-
cal advantages of increased limo usuage. A presentation of
the history of the policy reveals why and how the practical
realities make implementation problematic. Finally, I sug-
gest why the approach should remain alive - despite the lack
of support at present
Technical studies provide one basis to assess the feasi-
bility of an operational method like limos. Unlike other
types of operational options, there is relatively little
recent data on limo usage and potential in the Boston area.
No one with whom I spoke about limos mentioned data to ex-
plain why they did or did not support the idea. Three
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earlier studies, however, provide valuable analysis: Colver-
dale and Colpitts (1970), BTPR (1972), and the 1975 Logan
Master Plan. The conclusions of all three put forth a rather
persuasive case to support limo usage.
The Colverdale and Colpitts survey provides an analysis
of attitudes of Logan Airport users. Users were asked to
rank order preferences for new transit services to Logan.
"Direct suburban express bus service" came out on top of the
list. "Replace the Airport shuttle bus with rail service,"
was second, and last was "direct downtown express bus service
to Logan." 7  The factors people were most interested in
seeing improved, which included travel time, convenience, and
travel environment, could be satisfied by a limo or bus
service. 8 These factors were used as a basis of discussions
about limos in the 1975 Master Plan. 9
The 1972 BTPR study mainly addressed the issue of a
harbor crossing but it also assessed a number of other alter-
natives. Of these alternatives, the study concluded that one
of the two "most effective individual improvements" to the
existing Logan congestion was limo service. 1 0 The Review
performed an analysis to determine the proportion of trips
divertable to limo and found that between 30 and 55 percent
of the potential "market" might take limos. This outcome
depended on a number of actions such as: (1) making parking
at Logan more difficult by increasing parking fees and
decreasing the number of spaces; and (2) provision of special
limo lanes or a special purpose harbor crossing to increase
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the relative speed of travel by these modes during the peak
periods.11
In 1975, the Logan Master Plan concluded that an
"expanded limo system would provide the greatest net benefits
of reducing traffic congestion at Logan." 1 2  The Plan
detailed the most likely market areas in which expansion of
services could occur, and requirements for fringe airport
parking in support of the limo services. The Plan analyzed
limo demand and operating cost per route at four alternative
levels of service. The Report estimated that limo usage in
some areas might triple, with the possibility of even greater
demand in outlying sections such as that between Routes 128
and 495.13
The projection of ridership until 1990 anticipated that
with improved levels of service, 27 percent of Logan passen-
gers would use limos. In drawing this conclusion, the Plan
study team recognized that projecting growth of ridership is
difficult because of lack of sufficient data. Nonetheless,
the team assumed that the high (1973-74) growth rate of limo
usage (23 % per year) would continue. This rate depended on
implementation of a "favorable state policy" coupled with an
"aggressive, coordinated" limo program. The program
included: eliminating licensing problems, securing fringe
parking, a Massport marketing effort, a Logan parking price
increase, and head-of-the-line privileges for limos at
several points in downtown Boston. The plan did not rule out
subsidies, especially during the start up phases. 1 4
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Limo service can tap the markets of the suburban and
outlying areas of Boston. It can also attract airport
employees, non-residents, out-of-towners, and those with
luggage. Passengers can also enjoy a considerable financial
savings by opting for limos. The limo fare to Lowell was $6
in 1975 whereas a taxi cost $28.25.15 If demand for services
increases, costs to the operator drop and the operator may
lower fares or increase the frequency of service. Unlike
transit services, limos offer a guaranteed seat and deliver
directly to the terminal.
Many of the operational advantages of increased limo
usage were mentioned earlier - such as little or no construc-
tion, low costs, short lead time, and policy flexibility.
Limos can also be flexible both in the areas they serve and
size of vehicle (bus, car). Progress can be monitored and
assessed to decide on any changes on routing or timing.
Although there seem to be many attractive features to
using limos to help alleviate congestion problems, the feasi-
bility of expanding their use, given operational and politi-
cal considerations, is problematic. A review of the history,
the various parties involved, and their stake in the issue
clarifies why limos remain a controversial and a very
modestly utilized strategy at present.
The agencies and other parties involved in any effort to
encourage use of limos include: Massport, the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities (DPU), the Massachusetts
Department of Public Works (DPW), the Massachusetts Turnpike
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Authority (MTA), the City of Boston, the taxi industry and
the limo operators. Each of these actors has a different
stake in the policy.
Massport is concerned with the overall problem of access
to Logan. It is interested in limos mainly as one option
that might help diffuse congestion and ensure Logan's
continued accessibility. The MTA and the City of Boston
would be involved if a limo policy included provision of
head-of-the-line privileges and/or other physical improve-
ments on streets near or through the Sumner and Callahan
Tunnels. The City also regulates the taxi industry while the
DPU regulates the limos. Since limo service is likely to
require parking in outlying areas then discussion with the
DPW would be necessary to review the status of any potential
sites for acquisition of lots. Meetings with existing owners
of lots such as shopping malls would also have to take place.
The taxi industry sees itself very much a part of any changes
to encourage limos as they also seek increased mode share of
the Logan market. Finally, the limo operators would also
have a stake.
Debate about the increase usage of limos began in the
early 1970s (e.g., the BTPR Study). Although it was not
until 1976 that Massport incorporated an explicit policy
statement about limos. This statement set forth four ways to
actively encourage use of limos and decrease the number of
private autos. They included: (1) "identifying new areas to
be served;" (2) assisting with the permit process; (3)
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working with the City of Boston to improve routing for limos
in the city; and, (4) "to provide for priority lanes and
head-of-the-line privileges." 1 6 In 1976 Massport met with
limo operators to discuss routes and worked to make the
public more aware of the services available. Massport pro-
vided "a public relations subsidy, not an operating subsidy,"
said Cathy Donaher, by publishing brochures with limo
schedules and fees.
Cab drivers, in turn, saw their most lucrative rides
jeopardized by this vigorous interest in limos. Boston cabs
and cabs from outlying areas, who technically are not allowed
to pick up fares from Logan but prefer to "dead head" the way
back rather than lose the fares, began to fight limos in the
DPU licensing process. All scheduled limo operators are
required by law to satisfy certain regulations overseen by
the DPU. One part of this process is a public hearing in
every city and town the route passes through. Together the
suburban and Boston cabs were a significant force. Large
numbers of cab drivers would come to each hearing and voci-
ferously pressure the DPU to deny approval of new routes to
limos which passed into their areas.
The cab drivers feel that Massport's aim to reduce
traffic and pollution "has a hollow ring." After all, re-
ported Taxi Digest, a bus (or large limo) "is some three
times the size of a car" and "spews more pollution." 1 7 The
cabs, with an extremely effective network and a few large
operators, were prepared to "fight every step of the way."
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In the spring of 1977, cab drivers went on a 3-day
strike, accusing Massport of unfair support of their competi-
tion. Massport had assisted a limo operator to secure a
permit for a route which included shuttle service to a Newton
hotel. Ann Hershfang, Massport Board Member at the time,
said that judging by the Letters to the Editor of the Boston
Globe, public opinion was not very sympathetic to the strike
but it did cause substantial disruption. Negotiations took
place with the State acting as a broker between the City
which represented the cab companies, and Massport. Share-a-
cab, a program which enables cabs to have access to an addi-
tional segment of the market, emerged as a result.
Hershfang, a strong advocate of promoting limos, called the
share-a-cab outcome a "gift to the cabs."
As a result of the upheaval of the strike, Massport
maintained, during the 1977-1979 period, a relatively low
profile on the limo issue. Again in 1980 the agency did some
demand analysis looking at existing routes and isolated
corridors which were not being served. Ted Baldwin, a Mass-
port aviation planner at the time, recalls that the main
issue for limo operators was the high capital costs (due to
interest rates) of expanding their fleet to meet this esti-
mated demand. The operators urged Massport to buy vehicles
and then lease them back. Despite Massport's overall
interest in limos, the agency refused. Such an action, which
could be viewed as a limo subsidy, was "political dynamite"
for Massport, because it could provoke the cab drivers again.
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There are mixed views about Massport providing subsidies
of any type to limo operators. Some Massport staff members
think the agency should not become involved in such activi-
ties in the private sector. Others like consultant Brian Day
support efforts to subsidize "high-occupancy modes" such as
limos. He is convinced that Massport should cross subsidize
limos using revenues from the imposition of higher landing
fees on air carriers.
The volatility of the cab drivers surfaced again last
year when they went on strike for 3 days. They alleged that
unscheduled limos, many not properly authorized, were solici-
ting passengers inside the terminals and demanded that Mass-
port intervene to stop the limo drivers. One observer felt
the resolution of the action, setting up a "limo pool" for
unscheduled services that require operators to provide the
flight and passenger name before leaving the pool, favors the
taxi position because a limo pool lessens the presence of
limos at the curb. On the other hand, unlike before the
strike, neither taxis nor limos can enter the terminals to
solicit passengers.
Another policy Massport considered in 1976 regarding
limos was priority lanes. The agency's commitment was
tempered by Boston's angry reaction to the introduction of
diamond lanes (priority lanes for high occupancy vehicles) on
the Southeast Expressway in 1977. Their removal was termed
"good news" by the local news media. 1 8 Additionally, there
are operational problems with priority lanes. "You can't put
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them where you want them," observed Massport Chair Robert
Weinberg. They are "out of the question" in a two-lane
tunnel, also, the Boston street configuration is not easily
adaptable.
At present an informal relationship between Massport and
limo operators exists. Massport staff carries out demand
analyses and quietly encourages service expansion. There is
no data on the success of these -efforts, according to Joe
Green, Director of Massport's ground transportation services.
Massport has also worked to streamline the complicated
bureaucratic process to secure limo licensing permits.
These efforts combined with cutbacks in the MBTA have
resulted in a rise in limo passenger volumes. From 1970 to
1977, limo mode share increased from 6.0 to 8.4 percent,
thereby surpassing transit as an access mode.1 9 Since 1978,
25 new limo services have been added. Of these, only two -
one limo and one bus - are scheduled. 2 0 Scheduled services,
offering specific routes at specific times, as mentioned
earlier are required by law to have a permit from the DPU.
Non-scheduled limos do not need a permit and can operate from
any city or town. Massport requests that unscheduled opera-
tors have a letter with approval of operation from its base
city or town. Unscheduled limos are not allowed to publish
schedules or solicit passengers; passengers must make reser-
vations in advance.
Massport records since 1981 show improving revenues and
numbers of passengers on most bus and limo lines. 2 1 The rise
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may be illusory and just a projection of more complete data
gathering since 1981.22 In an effort to have a more accurate
picture of limo operations, a database of services is due to
be completed this month. The "pool" for unscheduled limos
has probably made it more difficult for unscheduled services
to circumvent payment. 2 3 Limos might be encouraged to under-
state their popularity due to the structure of Massport's fee
system. To access Logan, limos pay 5 percent of gross
revenues whereas taxis pay $.50 for each trip. It is worth
considering how much Massport stands to gain financially from
limos vs. cabs. 2 4 According to M.E. Sullivan of Massport,
this aspect of ground transportation has not been explored.
Despite these positive developments and recognition that
ridership was increasing, most people interviewed for this
paper felt that under current pricing and operating condi-
tions, the potential market for limos was extremely limited.
One Massport staff member felt that only a 0.5-1.0 percent
increase in mode share could be achieved by more extensive
activity. 2 5 Furthermore, almost no one I spoke to seemed to
have anything positive to say about the future of the
approach though many advocated it in principle. Two types of
problems - operational and political - were cited. Opera-
tional problems included the infrequency of service, the poor
peak hour service that is "unlikely to improve," and the
limited market.
Perhaps there are several reasons limos are not being
widely used. There are too many other "costs" incurred for
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passengers. Frequent travelers, for example, are less sensi-
tive to transport prices and tend to value their time highly.
A short outbound journey can be time-consuming because the
limo may make several stops. Also, while passengers may
expect taxis to be available when they arrive at an airport,
they may not know of a limo service. For an inbound journey
many travelers have to transport themselves to the limo
service.
Aside from the inflammatory nature of the cab situation,
a limo policy entails other political considerations. Mass-
port is more directly involved with this issue than other
agencies and consequently it is likely to be viewed as
"responsible" for any blame or receive the credit for any
outcome of a policy. When the cabs are causing chaos in all
of Boston, or parking becomes impossible at Logan, it is not
easy to divorce Massport from the event. Massport assumes
that the taxi industry will continue to react as it has in
the past, which constricts the agency's ability to actively
promote an explicit limo program.
The threat of a cab strike is immediate while any bene-
fits of increased limo usage are long-term. Unlike the use
of one way tolls which are discussed later, a "trial period"
cannot be used to measure success. Public outrage in
reaction to changes such as increases in parking fees and/or
fewer spaces available are likely to be an immediate liabi-
lity. People may not yet be prepared to tolerate such incon-
venience in their lifestyle to help alleviate what they
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consider a "normal" part of Logan travel. Weinberg felt that
if Salvucci had a "bureaucratic triumph" on the Third Harbor
Crossing issue (i.e., building a consensus and resolving the
funding issue), then he would be "allowed a few potential
failures" (i.e., controversial policies) such as some type of
limo subsidy.
Weinberg views ground access as EOTC's problem. Since the
degree of momentum at the agency is so strongly influenced by
who is governor and who 'controls' the Board (i.e., which
governor has appointed the majority of Board members ), it is
not surprising that Massport's initiatives on the issue
during the King administration were limited by his agenda for
the Third Harbor Crossing. Furthermore, some Massport staff
question whether it's Massport's role, or if only EOTC has
authority to promote limos - especially when the issue of
subsidies is involved.
Support by other public agencies is another necessary
political consideration which an agency such as Massport must
not overlook. For example, agencies sensitive to the con-
cerns of the East Boston community might be reluctant to
support any initiatives that could be interpreted as
promoting Logan's growth. If Massport aggressively advocated
a limo policy, many constituencies, including other agencies,
would be affected. Some public responses may be negative -
the DPW might receive complaints from communities opposed to
using DPW lots for airport fringe parking. In other
instances, a forceful limo policy might coincide with the
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aims of an agency such as the City of Boston. The "philo-
sophy" of the City, according to Phil Caruso, is essentially
an operational approach supporting the use of "what is
existing before there are any construction efforts." A limo
policy seems to be the type of policy the city would consi-
der. Also, a limo policy might possibly be agreeable to
residents of East Boston (another concern of the City) if
residents begin to view limos as as option to aid in conges-
tion relief and the need for a Third Harbor Crossing.
Despite the political risks involved in promoting limo
usage, I think a strategy should be actively considered. I
am convinced that with careful political planning, the com-
mitment of Massport and EOTC, and mobilization of public
opinion to challenge the position taken by the cabs, there is
a real possibility of substantial increase in usage of limo
services. The cab dilemma must be carefully addressed.
These efforts might also generate some political benefits but
they will not likely emerge for several years. Thus, pur-
suing a limo policy needs political figures willing to commit
themselves with few pay-offs at the outset. Over time, if
several constituencies (e.g., business in and outside of the
CBD, East Boston, legislators, etc.) began to apply pressure
on cabs in conjunction with favorable media attention to
limos, the taxi industry might begin to find itself isolated
and in a less powerful position.
Since 1972, the percentage of private cars used to access
Logan has decreased from 82.4 to 67.7 percent. Although the
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largest mode increase was in taxis, increased willingness to
use modes other than private car should be noted. Still,
most people do not think of taking a limo to Logan. For a
limo policy to be viable, these attitudes must change.
Shifts in public opinion can stem from many sources: a
united political front on the issue, persuasive technical
information, vigorous public relations and marketing, finan-
cial incentives, etc. These would have to be explored in
depth. Finally, a limo policy requires energy and commitment
by those willing to take on the task of organizing a serious
attempt at this approach. This would require financial
backing, a willingness within public agencies to support
active development of the policies, and sheer brain power.
The use of one-way tolls, an operationally simple method
to improve the traffic capacity in the Sumner and Callahan
Tunnels, is an idea which has been discussed in Boston for
over ten years. Since "90 percent of the arguments are
political," according to Boston Traffic Commissioner Vitag-
liano, it is not surprising that this "logical approach" to
improve access was not so simple to implement. 2 6 This analy-
sis will look at the technical studies of one-way tolls in
Boston followed by an explanation of some of its traffic
features. Then, the history and political issues will be
presented which will clarify why this policy has been imple-
mented.
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The one-way tolls instituted in the Sumner and Callahan
Tunnels and the Tobin Bridge require motorists to pay double
the toll in the inbound direction into Boston and nothing
outbound. The policy is designed to relieve congestion on
the Central Artery for northbound motorists in the evening
and ease the traffic to Logan in the Callahan Tunnel. The
technical justifications for a one-way toll policy include
favorable data from recent studies and many attractive opera-
tional features. The technical studies performed by Tom
Lisco (CTPS, 1980), Day (Massport, 1982), and Chia (MIT,
1983) have all concluded that one-way tolls would aid traffic
flow.
Lisco's study concludes that one-way tolls are not
especially useful. Robert Weinberg maintains, however, that
Lisco answered the wrong question in the right way. He
determined that one-way tolls would have negligible speed
effects. When Lisco's data are applied to the "right"
question - that of potential tunnel capacity - then, as Day's
study points out, they suggest a potential capacity increase
of 7-14 percent. Day concluded that 200-300 additional
vehicles could use the facility in the p.m. peak hours. 2 7
David Chia's analysis of one-way tolls examines the
subtleties of toll booth and tunnel interaction. The toll
booths and the tunnel have service times that work in a
series but continue to fluctuate. Once the booths are
removed, and people don't slow down at that point, the tunnel
itself clearly becomes the point of constraint. The tunnel
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will remain congested; for any given individual it may not be
better but the number able to pass through should be
greater. 2 8
There are also several operational advantages to one-way
tolls including many of the characteristics mentioned
earlier. The cost is low, lead time is short, construction
requirements minimal and overall disruption is low. The
nature of one-way tolls makes a-demonstration period easy
although Boston is the only city to ever have a demonstra-
tion. Perhaps this suggests that policy makers were uncer-
tain of the outcome. There is practical experience to draw
on from other cities. California has operated about nine
bridges with one-way tolls since 1969, including the Golden
Gate Bridge. The New York-New Jersey Port Authority has
operated nine bridges and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels
with one-way tolls since 1979. One-way systems in all of
these cases have been deemed successful because of increased
capacity of the facility and improved traffic flow.
In the Boston debate over one-way tolls, which originated
from a 1971 U.S. Department of Transportation report, several
parties have been involved over the years. The owners of the
facilities are key players; the MTA operates the tunnels
while Massport operates the Tobin Bridge. The City of Boston
is involved because many of the roads to and from the
facilities are their responsibility. It is helpful to have
the support of the Traffic Commissioner of Boston, who is a
member of Massport's Board. The approval of the Mayor is
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also useful. Other concerned groups include the tolltakers,
the East Boston community, and the local banks.
Both Massport and the MTA floated bonds to build their
respective facilities and, hence, are responsible for
repaying a fixed sum to the bondholders. Until the facili-
ties are paid off, the banks have a claim on the asset (the
facility). If anything should hinder the revenue gathering
ability of the agencies to make their payments, technically,
the banks could intervene.
Many of the tolltakers have their jobs at stake. Their
acquiesence is necessary for the smooth implementation of the
policy.
Finally, the Governor plays a role in two ways: first,
he makes appointments to the Massport and MTA Boards; second,
the willingness of EOTC to back selected policy initiatives
often stems directly from the Governor's stance on the issue.
The coordination of these actors is no simple task. As
the history of the issue shows, there is no "natural" leader,
or constitutional home for this policy other than EOTC.
Despite some debate about the idea prior to the Lisco study,
there was little progress when only Massport and the MTA were
the central agencies involved in the discussions. Massport
favored one-way tolls while the MTA opposed the idea arguing
that the change would result in diversion of toll revenues
costing the agency $600,000 annually. The MTA postulated
that a one-way toll system with double fares would result in
a 7.3 percent reduction in traffic in the Sumner Tunnel. 2 9
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To avoid the tunnel some drivers would enter the city over
one of the three free bridges - via Malden, Wellington, or
Route 93.
Another reason the MTA was opposed to the toll policy,
though not explicitly stated by MTA staff, relates to the
MTA's support of the Third Harbor Crossing. The MTA, former
Governor King and other strong proponents of the Third Harbor
Crossing believed that one-way tolls should only be consi-
dered in the context of analysis of the Third Harbor
Crossing. Thus as long as King was Governor, there would be
little progress on one-way tolls as an independent option to
improve access in the short-term. Vitagliano suggests that
the MTA was "foot-dragging" because, like King, they saw the
traffic relief generated by one-way tolls as detracting from
the case for a Third Harbor Crossing. 3 0
Despite the opposition of the MTA, the studies produced
some interest. But any hopes for the policy vanished when
King gained "control" through appointments to the Massport
Board in 1982 and delayed further discussion. Only after
Dukakis was reelected late that year and, by a quirk,
regained control of the Board did the issue appear in the
forefront again. Secretary Salvucci then initiated and
became the driving force behind the adoption of the plan.
Two other circumstances aided the chances of one-way
tolls' success. Ken Pierson, Operator of the Tobin Bridge for
Massport, took an early retirement. Pierson had been
adamantly against one-way tolls, although Massport staff
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could only speculate on the reasons why. Their ideas in-
cluded: (1) that it was a "turf" issue - his staff would be
cut; (2) that he considered one-way tolls to be unsafe be-
cause cars would speed; or, (3) that he just took a stand and
committed himself to it. The second development is the
approaching conclusion of the MTA Director John Driscoll's
present term this July. Since Secretary Salvucci, a major
power behind one-way tolls, has a lot of influence in the
Governor's transportation-related appointments, it is not
illogical that Driscoll felt some pressure to agree to a
plan.
Before the MTA would concur, it insisted on its own study
to assess the effects of diversion of cars on MTA revenues.
The consultants estimated $600,000, but suggested that an
experimental period would be the only way to provide a basis
for reliable forecasting. Also, according to a Boston Globe
report, the revenue losses would be paritally offset by labor
saving of $400,000-$500,000 so that the net cost would "pro-
bably be $100,000 to $200,000 a year. 3 1 Citing "uncertain-
ties" in the 1977 data the firm used, one of the consultants
admitted to David Chia that the parameters of the 1983 study
were continuously altered until an appropriate number
emerged. "There was no methodology," observed Chia who re-
viewed the report. 3 2
The toll collectors remain opposed to the policy. Their
union, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, has sued Massport. An injunction to delay the three-
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month demonstration was denied, but it is interesting to note
that the suit was filed when removal of the toll booths was
half completed. 3 3 Massport's Executive Director, Dave Davis
said that none of the 70 tolltakers would lose their jobs if
the innovation became permanent. 3 4 It seems the toll collec-
tors are not satisfied with reemployment elsewhere in the
agency. Additionally, some of those not switching have had
to accept less appealing shifts. 3 5
Finally, residents in the East Boston and Chelsea areas
are worried about traffic problems associated with the new
policy. Increased congestion may result from diverted
traffic using local streets to avoid the high inbound toll.
There is also concern that cars will be traveling at exces-
sive speeds in the outbound direction because they will not
be required to slow down at the toll booths. The Board of
Aldermen in Chelsea adopted a resolution urging Massport and
the MTA not to go ahead because of these issues (and their
concern with the lay-off of Chelsea residents employed at the
facilities). 3 6 There has not been any further action against
the experiment; it commenced on May 2nd.
Clearly most of the debate surounding one-way tolls has
had to do less with whether it will help the traffic problem
than with the political concerns of each of the parties.
There are some positive political characteristics that might
appeal to agencies. The number of agencies involved allows
any blame to be diffused among them. Furthermore, the demon-
stration format offers an excellent opportunity for agencies
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to "save face" if needed. Another appealing aspect of one-
way tolls is that it is not disruptive to people's habits;
there is no massive construction or forced behavioral change.
People can still drive their cars just as before May 2nd.
Finally, public officials like to be seen as taking action on
issues to show that government "cares." One might argue that
one-way tolls is significant because it represents some acti-
vity to improve the situation while its proponents have no
illusions about it solving the problem.
One of the political difficulties of one-way tolls
according to Richard deNeufville, MIT professor and airport
specialist, is that "there is just too much inertia in the
system." These projects require a lot of time for what seems
like a rather uneventful result. Weinberg would probably
agree. It is easy, Weinberg says, to think and develop
useful ideas but it is making it happen that takes time.
"There are no aggressive proponents in the bureaucracy, so it
sits," he commented. Several people said they weren't sur-
prised that one-way tolls took so long. No one I spoke with
thought one-way tolls would not help, but some viewed it as a
more significant solution than others. A top member of
Salvucci's staff at EOTC calls one-way tolls a "band-aid"
solution. "But a band-aid can halt the blood coming and keep
away infection," observes Tom Humphrey, MIT research asso-
ciate. DeNeufville and Chia did not view the technical
information as adequate before Chia's contribution. However,
once the political drive is in place to implement a policy,
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studies assume a less important role.
Given the arguments for a one-way tolls policy, it is not
surprising that I think the policy is long overdue. The
issue to consider then is how such projects can be achieved
quicker and with minimum political hassle. "Not in Boston"
was the common response. Perhaps if the MTA and Massport
viewed one-way tolls as an opening for more cooperation on
ground access issues they might together anticipate issues in
the future and address them more efficiently. Informal dis-
cussion among the Boards and/or staff could begin soon on a
variety of Logan-related issues. The role of EOTC in making
one-way tolls a reality was critical. Its importance in
future policy initiatives cannot be overstated. EOTC can
serve a critical function to inspire and enable other state
agencies to see that they have a shared stake in some issues.
EOTC can also provide the necessary support to agencies
unwilling to pursue more politically controversial projects
that might have impressive long-run results despite short
term risks.
One-way tolls can be seen as the foot in the door for
operational responses. Perhaps its smooth implementation and
the noticeable improvement in traffic flow will serve to
stimulate agencies to consider more operational responses and
actually have momentum to see them happen. Active interest
inside public agencies from the staff and leadership combined
with the recognition of the merits of a project to relieve
traffic congestion is a solid beginning.
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Conclusion
Improving ground access to Logan Airport is an ongoing
technical problem for the Boston Region. Given the extended
time frame as well as the expense of the physical solutions
under consideration, this paper examines two short-term
operational solutions. The cases of one-way tolls and in-
creased limo usage suggest that political factors exist that
must be addressed before operational approaches can be imple-
mented.
The previous chapters have shown how the political
postures of state and local agencies have influenced the
outcome of these operational responses. Failure to implement
a one-way tolls policy in the past has been due to inter-
governmental issues. After years of discussion, however,
several political factors that were critical to the implemen-
tation of the policy are now in place.
First, the one-way tolls policy allows for diffusion of
responsibility so that no single agency is accountable for
the success or failure of the outcome. It should be noted,
however, that the chance of backlash is considerably less
when a policy is as non-disruptive, both physically and
behaviorally, as this one is. The minimal disruption of one-
way tolls is the second reason for its success. There is
little construction and construction-related disruption
associated with implementation. In addition, the public's
travel behavior is, for the most part, left intact. One-way
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tolls provides agencies with the opportunity to be seen as
taking action on the congestion issue. Policies are more
likely to be pursued by agencies when policies can be con-
strued by the public as demonstrating a genuine interest in
solving the problem.
Like one-way tolls, increased limo usage is an opera-
tionally viable approach to relieve congestion, but political
factors have, to date, presented-major barriers to its suc-
cessful implementation. The vocal dissatisfaction of cab
drivers has been one major difficulty. Politicians respond
to the needs of constituents, particularly when interest
groups are vocal, well organized and, as in the case of the
cab drivers, strike to attract attention to their case.
Political difficulty often arises when an agency is
directly linked to the negative ramifications of a policy
decision. In this case, Massport has been consistently
linked to the disturbance generated by the cab drivers
strike. The unfavorable public reaction the agency received
provides little incentive for it to act. A third politically
unattractive aspect of a limo policy is the disruptive nature
of actions needed to supplement such a policy. To ensure
some adequate level of success, parking rates would have to
be increased, most probably causing negative public reaction.
What then can be concluded about future solutions to the
ground access problem? As has been suggested, operational
methods, such as one-way tolls and limo usage, are subject to
political pressures. Neither policy quite fits the mandate
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of an existing agency nor does either have vocal constituency
support. Operational solutions yield few visible benefits
but may impose significant costs when they disrupt existing
patterns of travel. Although physical projects also have
costs and create controversy, their benefits are clear: the
public can visually see the project emerging and construction
produces jobs, contracts and immediate congestion relief.
One might conclude, therefore, that unless an organized vocal
constituency exists to support operational solutions, the
political rewards for such solutions are minimal.
The two cases examined in this paper suggest that the
political process inhibits the implementation of operational
responses. The aim of political officials to keep contro-
versy at a minimum can be viewed as desirable or as an objec-
tive that works against the process. Lack of movement is
evident, for example, in the limo issue where it seems there
has been little activity and no coherent strategy since the
first three day cab strike in 1977. Some might argue that
this reveals the weakness of the political process - that it
cannot recover from such a disruptive event. I would argue,
however, that so long as there is no direct pressure to
confront an issue, the actors in the political process shy
away from politically risky issues. This results in many
missed opportunities to deal with issues efficiently and
effectively.
The parameters of political feasibility, though, can and
do change. What may be viewed today by the public as a
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disruptive and unacceptable response, may in the future
represent a more tolerable imposition compared to the current
inconvenience of traveling to Logan during peak hours. Per-
haps only when agencies perceive that solving the congestion
problem is also an effective way to satisfy a large number of
constituent groups will they be prepared to take political
risks. In the course of waiting for such changes in the
political environment, however, traffic congestion could
reach the crisis level. To avoid this, initiatives to culti-
vate and build support for operational solutions should begin
now. The cases display the difficulty of developing support
for operational policies across several political institu-
tions. To assist in this process EOTC, the MTA and/or Mass-
port could, for example, create a reasonably high level
position such as Director of Traffic Management to be respon-
sible for addressing both the technical and political needs
of selected operational responses.
One must of course consider how such a position could
become a useful mechanism to promote operational initiatives,
given that the poltical process does not appear to encourage
"public entrepreneurship." It would be helpful, for example,
if EOTC in conjunction with other agencies were to become
involved in developing this position. Joint input would aid
in future communication. Such a Director could concentrate
initially on generating interest inside political institu-
tions, focusing on broad objectives that coincide rather than
conflict. That is, to build a consensus on the less contro-
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versial aspects of operational solutions. The position must
serve to facilitate agency involvement with operational
issues, and to minimize political risk, on issues such as the
limo policy that have been controversial in the past.
Development of the position requires the commitment of
several highly respected top transportation people. As sup-
port inside political institutions develops, agencies can
work to create public interest in operational measures.
Momentum to develop responses to traffic congestion for the
next ten years must begin now regardless of the adoption of
any larger physical solution. If political issues now
hindering the adoption of viable operational measures can
begin to be addressed through some formal mechanism, such as
a Director of Traffic Management, then the political feasibi-
lity of these solutions to the ground access problem would be
greatly increased.
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Appendix II
Level of Service A: Traffic is free flowing without
Vnysical restrictions on speed or maneuverability.
-7
7-
Level of Service C: Traffic volume controls speed and
cnoice of lane. to a Oegree. but satisfactory movement
is still maintained Moderate delays are experienced.
'a
Level of Service E: Traff ic moves in an unstable flow
with low speeds, increased congestion, and delays.
Traffic volumes are at or near capacity.
Pictorial Representation of Level of Service
Source The Transooianon Research Boa- Washinion. D C
Level of Service'B: Traffic moves in a stable flow with
slight delays. Tne driver is reasonably free to choose
lane and speed.
k-4
Level of Service D: Traffic volume affects the mainte-
nance of soeed and choice of lane, causing congested,
unstable flow.
~N.
Level of Service F: Forced flow conditions (stop and
go). Traff ic moves at very low speeds, if at all, resulting
in significant congestion.
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